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THE NEW GREAT WALL AGAINST CHINA
PAUL ROSE*
This essay documents some of the recent changes in foreign investment law as a manifestation of increasing concerns
with Chinese investment specifically and globalization more generally. The essay first shows how foreign investment
laws in major economies have become increasingly illiberal since the Financial Crisis. Next, the essay considers the
justification and impact of recent United States rules designed to reduce Chinese investment. Comparing data on
merger and acquisition activity in the United States with the number of filings made to the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), the essay documents that although merger and acquisition activity is very
highly correlated with CFIUS notice filing activity over the past decade, the data suggest that enhanced regulation has
had its intended effect in reducing the amount of foreign investment in regulated industries and firms. In particular, the
regulation—and more importantly, the way that regulation has been enforced—has served its seemingly intended
purpose as a new “great wall” against Chinese investment.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly 100 years ago, a half dozen countries constructed a series of immigration laws that
historians later dubbed the “Great Wall Against China.”1 Constituting an arc that “ranged from the
Americas across the Pacific to Australasia and then across the Indian Ocean to South Africa,” the
countries enacted rules that protected domestic constituencies from “competition from cheap
Chinese labor.”2
History repeats itself, this time as a wall of investment restrictions. The rapid growth of
China’s economic and political power, coupled with aggressive and ambitious technology acquisition
and foreign investment efforts, have generated anxieties around the world. These anxieties
predictably appear most acute in countries whose citizens feel they have the most to lose, such as in
the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and Australasia (and, notably, many of the same countries
that create the Great Wall Against China a century ago). Reflective of this anxiety, views of China
are more negative in countries with higher per capita gross domestic product, with some of the

ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, The Great Wall Against China: Responses to the First Immigration Crisis, 1885-1925, in HOW MANY
EXCEPTIONALISMS? EXPLORATIONS IN COMPARATIVE MACROANALYSIS (2008).
2 MAE M. NGAI, The Chinese Question: The Gold Rushes and Global Politics, 1849–1910, in A GLOBAL HISTORY OF GOLD
RUSHES 109 (Benjamin Mountford & Stephen Tuffnell eds., 2018).
1
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highest negative perceptions in the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany. 3
China arguably stands as an avatar of globalization, representing dislocations and disruptions to the
status quo.
Governments have responded to these disruptions by expanding existing rules, imposing
new restrictions on foreign investment, or both, and much of this regulation appears designed
specifically to curb Chinese investments and acquisitions, especially of critical technologies. 4 The
regulations create investment barriers that, like the immigration barriers of a century ago, operate as
a new great wall against China.
This essay proceeds as follows. Part I frames the development of new investment
restrictions as a response to the effects of globalization and the recent turn to more nationalistic and
mercantilist views of cross-border investment. Then, Part II shows how foreign investment laws
generally have become increasingly illiberal, especially since the Financial Crisis, while Part III
describes specific foreign investment law changes made by the EU and Japan in response to
perceived threats from Chinese investment—changes designed to screen, if not stifle, new foreign
investments. Finally, Part IV turns to recent U.S. regulations, and specifically on the new U.S. wall
against Chinese investment: the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018
(FIRRMA). Comparing data on merger and acquisition activity in the United States with the number
of filings made to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, the essay contributes
two key findings. First, investment activity (measured through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) data)
is very highly correlated with CFIUS notice filing activity over the past decade. Second, despite high

Laura Silver et al., Attitudes Toward China, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 5, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/12/05/attitudes-toward-china-2019/.
4 Chinese investment appears to be the proximate cause of many of these regulatory responses, but there are more
fundamental movers driving these changes. Undoubtedly, the COVID-19 pandemic has played an important role in this
reaction and retraction, as supply shocks reminded companies and countries of the risks associated with cross-border
supply chains and highlighted the importance of health infrastructure as a critical element of national security. The trend
has also been affected, no doubt, by the Financial Crisis of 2007, which exposed weaknesses in the links in the global
financial system.
3
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levels of M&A activity in recent years, FIRRMA has had its intended effect in reducing the amount
of Chinese investment in regulated industries and firms since the construction of the new great wall.
The essay then concludes.
I.

GLOBALIZATION AS A VICTIM OF ITS OWN SUCCESS
The development of these investment barriers stands in contrast to decades of liberalization

of cross-border investment. The trend of liberalization resulted from the confluence of several
mutually-reinforcing phenomena in the 1970s and 1980s. First, companies began to increasingly rely
on capital markets, which “fed and liquified the economy.”5 Second, governments increasingly
privatized and deregulated their economies, a “silent revolution” 6 that “evaporated” financial
borders.7 Third, banks also became increasingly globalized as the result of aggressive growth and
consolidation, with the value of international banking transactions rising from 6% of global GDP in
1972 to almost 40% by the early 2000s.8
Foreign direct investment (FDI) rose as financial walls fell. In the fifteen years preceding the
Financial Crisis, countries enacted 2,159 national regulatory changes to liberalize or promote crossborder trade, compared to only 224 changes that restricted or hampered cross-border trade. 9 The
international investment climate became decidedly “more welcoming for foreign direct investors,” 10
aided by regulatory changes as well as multilateral investment agreements and, particularly, bilateral
investment agreements.11

Jean-Yves Huwat & Loīc Verdier, The 2008 Financial Crisis—A Crisis of Globalisation? in ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION:
ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES 126, 131 (OECD Publishing, 2013).
6 James Broughton, Globalization and the Silent Revolution of the 1980s, FIN. & DEV., March 2002, at 40, 41 (attributing the
term to Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund).
7 Huwat & Verdier, supra note 5, at 131.
8 Id. at 132.
9 UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2008: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGE 13 (2008).
10 KARL P. SAUVANT, FDI PROTECTIONISM IS ON THE RISE, WORLD BANK POL’Y RSCH. WORKING PAPER 5052, at 3
(2009).
11 Id.
5
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But globalization itself has propagated seeds of discontent, 12 with inequalities linked to an
increasing divergence in high-skilled and low-skilled employee wages, increasing concentrations of
wealth, and the globalization of capital markets;13 globalization has brought tremendous wealth, but
critics have argued that this wealth has benefitted the few at the expense of the many. 14 Increasingly,
foreign trade is no longer viewed as a “positive sum game” in which cross-border trading serves to
“enlarge the pie to mutually benefit all participants in the system.” 15 Instead, foreign investment is
taking a nationalistic turn. Cross-border trade is viewed as a “zero sum game,” and the pie of global
wealth “is of a permanently fixed size so that if one nation obtains a gain in trade than another
nation must suffer a corresponding loss.”16 In this framing, China’s rise represents a fall for its
economic competitors.
In the United States, as in other countries, foreign investment law has always served both as
a reflection of political and economic worries and a means to respond to those worries. From
concerns over rising German and Japanese economic power in the post-World War II era 17 to more
recent responses to the purchase of U.S. firms and assets by Middle Eastern 18 and Chinese
12 U.N.

Secretary-General, Fulfilling the Promise of Globalization: Advancing Sustainable Development in an Interconnected World, ¶
23, U.N. Doc. A/72/301 (Aug. 8, 2017) (noting that support for globalization and multilateralism has recently been
“undermined by popular discontent”).
13 Id. The report identifies three “mega-trends” that are significantly shaped by globalization, including a shift in
production and labor markets, rapid advances in technology, and climate change. As examples of how globalization
directly impacts equality, the report notes that “trade openness has improved the mobility of capital relative to labour,
eroding the bargaining power of labour”; rapid advances in technology will “leave those countries and people that are
structurally disadvantaged behind, and will thus reinforce inequalities at the national and global levels”; globalization is
also a “contributing factor to climate change and environmental degradation,” and those with less wealth are less able to
mitigate many of the risks associated with climate change.
14 See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 24, 29, 35 (2002).
15 Ian Sheldon et al., The Revival of Economic Nationalism and the Global Trading System, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133, 2137
(2019).
16 Id. at 2136 (noting that “[t]he adoption of an approach that is so fundamentally at odds with the underlying logic of
the GATT/WTO by the world’s most powerful trading nation poses a threat to the entire foundations of the multilateral
trading system”).
17 See Jeffrey S. Arpan et al., Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: The State of Knowledge in Research, 12 J. INT’L BUS.
STUDIES 137 (1981) (noting the use of terms such as “threat,” infiltration,” and “industrial offensives” to describe
foreign investment in the 1970s).
18 See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV. RL33388, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), 4
(2018) (describing the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) as a reaction to the 2006 sale of
several sensitive U.S. port operations by the British firm Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O) to
Dubai Ports World (DP World)).

6
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acquirors,19 U.S. law has regularly adapted to threats presented by politically-sensitive foreign
investment activity. Foreign investment law can also reveal more general economic anxieties, as the
shape and design of a barrier can give insights into what it is designed to protect against. Viewing
recent regulatory changes in this light, the increasing illiberality of foreign investment laws in the
United States—and in many other developed economies—reveals increasing public dissatisfaction
with foreign trade and, more broadly, the effects of globalization, including immigration, 20 rapid
technological shifts, and rising wealth inequality. This dissatisfaction was most clearly expressed
through the “America First” doctrine of the Trump administration (and indeed, was among the
explanations for the election of President Trump21), but the trend towards a more domesticallyfocused economic policy had already begun under President Obama, 22 and, given early indications, is
likely to continue under President Biden.23
II.

DATA ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW TRENDS
As the data in this section make clear, foreign investment law has undoubtedly trended

towards liberalization over the past several decades, and largely continues to do so. To be clear,
these data do not show that investment laws have reached a tipping point in which the overall trend

See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., CECELIA TACOLI & DAVID OKALI, INT’L INST. FOR ENV. AND DEV., THE LINKS BETWEEN MIGRATION,
GLOBALISATION, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2001),
https://pubs.iied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/migrate/11020IIED.pdf (noting that “[i]ncreased migration is one of the
most visible and significant aspects of globalisation: growing numbers of people move within countries and across
borders, looking for better employment opportunities and better lifestyles.” The ratio of world trade to GDP—a
measure of globalization—tripled in the years between 1960 and 2005. Likewise, the share of foreign-born population
living in OECD countries also tripled between 1960 to 2005. See Hillel Rapoport, Migration and Globalization: What’s in it
for Developing Countries?, GLM|LIC, at 1, 2 (Aug. 2016).
21 See, e.g., Laurence Chandy & Brina Seidel, Donald Trump and the Future of Globalization, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 18,
2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/11/18/donald-trump-and-the-future-of-globalization/ (noting
that “a resistance to globalization was arguably the foremost policy theme in Trump’s election campaign”).
22 See The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Trade Enforcement Record, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jan. 2015),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/january/fact-sheet-obamaadministration%E2%80%99s.
23 See Biden’s New China Doctrine, THE ECONOMIST (July 17, 2021),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/07/17/bidens-new-china-doctrine (describing the doctrine as
“protectionist” with an “us-or-them rhetoric”).
19
20
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is moving against globalization. However, the data do buttress the argument that governments are
facing increased public dissatisfaction with globalization, and are addressing that dissatisfaction in
part through increased investment restrictions. While increasing levels of investment restrictions do
not signal the death of globalization, to be sure, they may yet function as an early warning sign of
significant dangers ahead.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) compiles data on
shifts in foreign investment laws, dating back decades.24 Comparing these data shows a shift towards
more restrictive trade practices over the past three decades, with a steep COVID-19 pandemicrelated trend in 2020 (Figures 1 and 2).
Figure 1: Changes in national investment policies, 1992 – 2007
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development.25
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See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT,
https://unctad.org/publications-search?f[0]=product%3A397 (providing investment reports and statistics dating from
1991).
25 See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2010: INVESTING IN A LOWCARBON ECONOMY, 77, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2010_en.pdf; [hereinafter WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 2010]; U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2021,
INVESTING IN SUSTAINABLE RECOVERY, 109, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2021_en.pdf
[hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2021].
24
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Figure 2: Changes in national investment policies, 2008 – 2020
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development.26
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Figure 3. Restrictionist foreign investment policies changes as a percentage of total policy changes
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Source: United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development.27
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UNCTAD sees two relative bright spots in these data. First, the “huge [2020] surge in
regulatory or restrictive investment policy measures is mainly due to an extraordinary crisis

UNCTAD notes that the data do not include measures related to the general business climate, such as corporate
taxation, environmental or labor legislation.
27 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 24, at 76; WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2021, supra note 25, at 109-10.
28 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2021, supra note 25, at 134.
26
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situation and therefore does not necessarily indicate a permanent change in the policy trend.” 29 On
the other hand, it is also true that the twenty years between 2000 and 2020 saw a growing trend
toward more restrictive foreign investment regulation. And while UNCTAD data also show that
the number of countries implementing policies of liberalization and investment promotion still
outweigh the number of countries restricting investment, that data point also hides a salient
characteristic, revealed by a careful review of the list of countries liberalizing foreign investment
and those restricting foreign investment.30 Taking the period of greatest change, from May 2020 –
December 2020,31 it becomes apparent that the countries restricting trade were more likely to be
larger, developed countries—the ones that have the most to lose by disruption of the current
regime—while the countries still pursuing liberalization were poorer, developing countries, as seen
in Table 1.
Table 1. Countries Liberalizing and Restricting Foreign Investment, May 2020 – December 2020
Liberalizing Foreign Investment
Algeria, China, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Philippines, United
Arab Emirates, Angola, Cambodia, Cuba, Iraq,
Pakistan, Colombia, Panama, Rwanda, Uruguay, Viet
Nam, Bolivia, Uzbekistan, and Sri Lanka

Restricting Foreign Investment
Austria, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malta, New
Zealand, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain,
United Kingdom and the EU, Kenya, Oman, and the
United States of America

Lest it be argued that these regulatory responses were due simply to the particular concerns (say,
related to supply chain disruptions) of the pandemic, one can also review the list of countries that
implemented FDI screening mechanisms immediately prior to COVID-19. These include: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of
Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Spain, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United

Id. at 109.
See id. at 110-21.
31 See id. at 112, 116, 118-19 (noting that China’s rules both liberalized foreign investment rules in some respects, while
also enhancing some restrictions).
29
30
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States.32 Of course, as UNCTAD notes, the increase and concentration in FDI screening in more
developed countries may be explained by the fact these countries “are the main global destinations
for foreign investment, making them therefore more exposed to foreign takeovers in sensitive
sectors and activities.”33 Further, “many of these economies show a relatively high degree of
openness towards foreign investment, including in key economic sectors and infrastructure.” 34 They
are thus the countries benefitting from (but also very much affected by) globalization.
Domestic political factors often press against globalization, and help to explain the
prevalence of FDI screening mechanisms. Politicized, “backlash” responses to investment are most
common, naturally, following high-profile investments from political and economic rivals. During
the 1970s and 1980s, for example, concerns over “petrodollar investments from Middle Eastern
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries,” 35 as well as increasing German
and Japanese investment, appeared to produce widespread popular concern over foreign
investment.36 This trend continued with the FINSA amendments37 following the Dubai Ports World
investment controversy in 2006, and the 2018 FIRRMA amendments 38 in response to Chinese
investment activity.
Scholars have recognized this backlash response as the root of most major foreign
investment regulations. For example, Canes-Wrone, Mattioli, and Meunier investigated the
predictors of FDI backlash by analyzing large Chinese investments in the United States from 2000-

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Policy Monitor: National Security-Related Screening Mechanisms for
Foreign Investment, at 3 (Dec. 2019), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaepcbinf2019d7_en.pdf
[hereinafter Investment Policy Monitor].
33 Id. at 4.
34 Id.
35 Brandice Canes-Wrone, Lauren Mattioli & Sophie Meunier, Foreign Direct Investment Screening and Congressional Backlash
Politics in the United States, 22 BRIT. J. POL. INT’L REL. 666, 669 (2020).
36 Id. (citing a 1975 poll finding that 70% of American adults favored restrictions on “Arab oil money” investments, and
14% were in favor of a complete ban). Canes-Wrone, Mattioli, and Meunier also note that polling from the 1980s
suggested that “more Americans viewed [foreign investment] as bad than good for the economy . . . and that Japanese
investment in particular was viewed as more of a ‘threat’ than a positive development for the US economy.” Id.
37 See id.
38 See id. at 669-71.
32
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2014 and considering factors more likely to contribute to the initiation of a backlash 39 by members
of Congress. Their findings suggest that domestic politics condition the likelihood of backlash, and
that “the higher the percentage of unionised workers in an area, and the higher the percentage that
work in manufacturing, the more likely a completed deal is to receive congressional backlash.” 40 As
an unsurprising corollary, the members of Congress that tend to push for new regulations do not
represent the state receiving the investment, but instead tend to be from states with “higher levels of
labour unionisation and manufacturing, but which are not the economic beneficiaries of the inward
FDI;”41 in other words, from those states most susceptible to dislocation from globalization.
III.

THE SHAPE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATION
A brief review of the changes in regulations reveals concern with globalization in general,

but with particular unease among global economic powers with Chinese state investment, even
though not every country is explicit in naming China as a potential national security threat. Consider
the European Union’s implementation of Regulation 2019/452,42 for example, which establishes a
“framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union.” 43 The regulation was
written against a backdrop of increasing Chinese investment in Europe, particularly from 2010 –

See id. at 667. The authors build from a definition of “backlash” offered by Alter and Zürn in which a backlash is “a
particular form of political contestation with a retrograde objective as well as extraordinary goals and tactics that has
reached the threshold level of entering public discourse.” Karen J. Alter & Michael Zürn, Conceptualizing Backlash Politics:
Introduction to a Special Issue on Backlash Politics in Comparison, 22 BRIT. J. POL. INT’L REL. 563, 576-77 (2020). In their
definition, Canes-Wrone, Mattioli, and Meunier define congressional backlash as an effort by members of Congress to
“reshape the institutions and processes through which the investments are screened by the administrative state.” CanesWrone, Mattioli & Meunier, supra note 35, at 667.
40 Canes-Wrone, Mattioli & Meunier, supra note 35, at 675.
41 See id.
42 Regulation 2019/452, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019, Establishing a Framework for
the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments Into the Union, 2019 O.J. (L 79) 1, 1 [hereinafter Regulation 2019/452].
43 Id.
39

12
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2016, accompanied by a realization that China acts as “an economic competitor in the pursuit of
technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.” 44
Regulation 2019/452 was promulgated to provide the EU and its member states with a
greater ability to address “risks to security or public order” and to “adapt to changing
circumstances,” while still allowing member states the flexibility to impose even more restrictive
foreign investment regulations as dictated by individual member states’ security and public order
concerns.45 Note that the language of the regulation itself suggests a deviation from economic
liberalism. Rather than restricting the implementation of foreign investment rules to situations
implicating the national security of states—a traditional justification for foreign investment rules that
trumps free trade imperatives—states may put in place rules to address risks to the capacious notion
of “public order,” and to put in place rules that restrict the free movement of capital “on grounds of
public policy.”46
Under the rules, Member States may maintain, amend or adopt mechanisms to screen
foreign direct investments in their territory on the grounds of security or public order; the rules must
be transparent and not discriminate between third countries. 47 Member States must also set out the
circumstances triggering the screening, the grounds for screening and the applicable detailed
procedural rules.48 In all, fourteen European jurisdictions imposed new regulations post-COVID-19,
but the EU had set in motion a revision to member state FDI rules in 2019, before the pandemic.
Importantly, and similar to the U.S. regulations described in Part IV, the development of the EU

44.

EU-China – A Strategic Outlook, EUR. COMM’N 1 (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf.
45 Regulation 2019/452, supra note 42, at 2.
46 Id. at 1 (noting that the examples provided as factors for member states to consider in drafting legislation relate to
traditional concerns of national security, such as critical infrastructure, critical technologies, and investments by statecontrolled entities).
47 Id. at 6-7.
48 See id. at 7.
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amendments followed a spike in Chinese investment in 2016.49 Chinese investment decreased in the
following years due both to domestic headwinds—as “an acute focus on domestic recovery and risk
mitigation has reduced the appetite for outbound investment among Chinese regulators” 50—and
because of the “rising regulatory barriers”51 in the EU.
Japan, too, has implemented new foreign investment rules. Under the revised rules, even
relatively small, non-controlling investments can be reviewed or blocked. 52 While formerly the
acquisition of 10% or more of the stock of a company in a restricted sector could trigger a review of
the transaction, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act revisions now require notification and
potential review in deals involving only 1% or higher of stock in restricted sector companies. 53 For
deals involving the acquisition of 10% or more of stock in a target company that does not do
business in a restricted sector, the acquirer must submit a “post investment report.” 54
As with the U.S. rules, described below, Japan’s rules are designed to address potential
threats from Chinese firms and Chinese state-owned enterprises. 55 Sovereign wealth funds—of
which China has some of the largest in the world, including the $1.2 trillion China Investment

See THILO HANEMANN ET AL., TWO-WAY STREET—US–CHINA INVESTMENT TRENDS—2021 UPDATE, RHODIUM
GRP. (2021), https://rhg.com/research/twowaystreet-2021/ (noting that the capital of Chinese investment in American
Companies rose to $70 billion in 2016, which was the highest level to date before tapering off beginning in 2017).
50 Id.
51 See AGATHA GRATZ ET AL., CHINESE FDI IN EUROPE—2020 UPDATE, RHODIUM GRP. (2021),
https://rhg.com/research/china-europe-2020/.
52 See Frequently Asked Questions on the Amendment Bill of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, JAPAN MINISTRY OF
FINANCE (Oct. 19, 2021), https://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/fdi/faq_191031.pdf (elaborating on the
Japanese legislature’s national security rationale for reducing the threshold of foreign ownership in a Japanese
corporation that triggers scrutiny and review from government financial officials from 10% to 1%) [hereinafter Frequently
Asked Questions].
53 The restricted sectors include oil, railways, utilities, arms, space, nuclear power, aviation, telecoms and cybersecurity.
Amendment Bill of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Oct. 21, 2019). The Ministry of Finance has clarified
the reach of the regulation by categorizing each of Japan’s some 3,800 listed companies as falling into one of the three
following categories: companies subject to post-investment report only; companies for which prior-notification is
required but exemption is applicable; and companies for which prior-notification is required and exemption is not
applicable. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 52.
54 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 52.
55 Manesh Samtani, Japan’s New Foreign Investment Rules Take Effect, REGULATION ASIA (May 10, 2020),
https://www.regulationasia.com/japans-new-foreign-investment-rules-take-effect/ (stating that “the move to tighten
foreign investment restrictions is said to be aimed at preventing sensitive information and critical technologies from
leaking to other countries (such as China), and follows similar steps taken by the US and EU nations to protect national
security”).
49

14
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Corporation and the $800 billion State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) Investment
Company56—are specifically noted in the FAQs accompanying the regulation. The commentary is
notable for its understatement and elision. The question posed in the law’s commentary section
notes that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are not eligible for the exemption from prior notification
(“Does this mean that SWFs (sovereign wealth funds) and pension funds cannot benefit from the
exemption and always have to submit prior notification?”).57 The response in the commentary
obliquely states that “[i]f SWFs and pension funds are deemed to pose no risk to national security,
they are eligible for exemption from prior-notification,” 58 a kind of uncertainty and freedom of
operation loved by regulators and loathed by SWF dealmakers seeking clarity on the application of
the law.
China, interestingly, has trended in the opposite direction, modernizing and liberalizing their
foreign investment laws.59 Of course, China has historically been less open and liberal to foreign
trade, and is still below the new, lowered mean of foreign investment openness. 60

See Ranking, GLOBAL SWF, https://globalswf.com/top-100 (ranking the top 100 sovereign wealth funds) .
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 52.
58 Id. The FAQ also notes that “If SWFs and pension funds invest in listed companies through financial institutions
eligible for exemption and do not become shareholders of the listed companies, those SWFs and pension funds do not
need to submit prior-notification.” Id.
59 See INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investmentlaws/laws/317/china-foreign-investment-law-of-the-people-s-republic-of-china. Under Article 28 of the Foreign
Investment Law of the People's Republic of China, investments that fall within the 123 categories on the Market Access
Negative List (2020) are either prohibited or restricted. If restricted, investors may file an investment application with the
relevant regulator. If the investment falls outside of the 123 categories, investors may access the investment on equal
footing with Chinese investors. As a measure of increasing liberality, the number of sectors on the negative list has
decreased from 151 (2018) to 131 (2019) to, most recently, 123 (2020), of which 5 categories are prohibited and 118 are
restricted. The “prohibited” categories are themselves quite broad and nebulous, however, and include: 1) prohibited
sectors clearly established by laws, regulations, and State Council directives; 2) products, technologies, processes,
equipment, and behaviors that are prohibited or restricted by state industrial policies; 3) development activities that do
not meet the requirements of the main functional area; financial related businesses in violation of regulations; and 5)
prohibited internet-related business activities. See Dorcas Wong, China Releases 2020 Negative List for Market Access, CHINA
BRIEFING DEZAN SHIRA & ASSOCIATES, (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-2020-negativelist-market-access/. The restricted list includes a wide variety of market sectors, including agriculture, mining,
manufacturing, utilities, construction, wholesale and retail, transportation, warehousing, accommodations and catering,
information services, finance, real estate, leasing and business services, scientific research, residential services, education,
health and social work, culture, sports, and entertainment. Id.
60 The OECD calculates the mean openness of OECD countries as 0.06 (on a scale of 0 to 1, with 0 being open and 1
56
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THE U.S. WALL: THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISK REVIEW MODERNIZATION ACT
AND ITS IMPACT ON CHINESE INVESTMENT

Foreign investment regulation is inherently political in the United States, as it is in other
countries. Political and historical context provides a foundation for understanding why a particular
regulation was created and how it has evolved over the years. Additionally, context helps explain
how foreign investment regulation is not simply (or even primarily) about national security, but is
often a reflection of national insecurities. So it is with the recently enacted Foreign Investment Risk
Review Modernization Act.61 As a result of growing American concern related to Chinese
investment, the U.S. Congress recently revised its foreign investment law, less than a dozen years
after the last major overhaul.62 This section describes the development of the most recent round of
legislative changes, with particular focus on how those changes are meant to respond to U.S. worries
about the rise of China as a technological power and, more specifically, about how China is using
investments in sensitive U.S. technologies to facilitate that rise.
The principal U.S. regulator of foreign investment, the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States, was designed to exercise “primary continuing responsibility within the Executive
Branch for monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the United States, both direct and
portfolio, and for coordinating the implementation of United States policy on such investment.” 63 In
reviewing the history of CFIUS and foreign investment regulation since its creation in 1975, one
cannot separate the economic from the political; amendments to the CFIUS process have been a
series of political reactions to political and economic concerns. Arguably, CFIUS has been a tool for

being closed). China’s score of 0.21 is significantly higher than the mean, though the US is also more restrictive than the
mean, with a score of 0.09. See FDI Restrictiveness, OECD, https://data.oecd.org/fdi/fdi-restrictiveness.htm.
61 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018.
62 The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246.
63 Executive Order 11858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975).
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dealing with the insecurities brought about by globalization, rather than merely a tool to enforce
domestic security through the regulation of the sale of sensitive technology to foreign investors.
Through the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, CFIUS has most
recently been tasked with staunching the flow of technology to China. 64 And, if CFIUS is also
designed to help manage globalization insecurity, CFIUS seems to be tasked with staunching a
perceived flow of wealth, prestige, and power to China. CFIUS is not just a shield against these
forces, however; it is also a sword that can be used to pursue executive political prerogatives and
force other countries into a defensive political and economic posture.
China presents a unique problem for U.S. foreign investment regulation as it is at once the United
States’ most “consequential” trading partner while also its “most significant military and geopolitical
rival.”65 The list of U.S. government grievances against Chinese trade and industrial policies is
extensive. As was summarized by the Trump administration, China “uses foreign ownership
restrictions, including joint venture requirements, equity limitations, and other investment
restrictions, to require or pressure technology transfer from U.S. companies to Chinese entities;” 66
“imposes substantial restrictions on, and intervenes in, U.S. firms’ investments and activities,
including through restrictions on technology licensing terms;” 67 “directs and facilitates the systematic
investment in, and acquisition of, U.S. companies and assets by Chinese companies to obtain
cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property and to generate large-scale technology transfer in

See Mercy A. Kuo, CFIUS and China: The FIRRMA Factor, THE DIPLOMAT (October 17, 2018),
https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/cfius-and-china-the-firrma-factor/l; Evan Zimmerman, The Foreign Risk Review
Modernization Act: How CFIUS Became a Tech Office, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1267 (2019).
65 Kuo, supra note 64.
66 Press Release, President Trump Announces Strong Actions to Address China’s Fair Trade (March 22, 2018),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/march/president-trump-announces-strong.
67 Id.
64

Vol. 12, No. 1

THE NEW GREAT WALL AGAINST CHINA

17

industries deemed important by Chinese government industrial plans:” 68 and “conducts and
supports unauthorized intrusions into, and theft from, the computer networks of U.S. companies.” 69
In response to these concerns, FIRRMA sets up a variety of new definitions to help capture
and regulate transactions that threaten national security. CFIUS may consider “whether a covered
transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared strategic goal
of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect United States
[technological and industrial leadership] in areas related to national security,” 70 a provision written
with China clearly in mind, given the Made in China 2025 Plan.71 The legislation also responds to the
Ralls case, in which Chinese investors purchased a windfarm near a U.S. military installation and
were forced to unwind the transaction,72 but later successfully argued that CFIUS had not provided
due process in its decisionmaking. FIRRMA empowers CFIUS to review transactions involving real
estate purchases involving a “land, air, or maritime port,” or which involve land “in close proximity
to a United States military installation or another facility or property of the United States
Government that is sensitive for reasons relating to national security.” 73
FIRRMA also expands CFIUS’s power to review transactions involving “critical
technology,” and expands the range of transactions covered by the legislation to any investment
(other than a passive investment) by a foreign person in any United States critical technology or
United States critical infrastructure company that is unaffiliated with the foreign person. 74 FIRRMA

Id.
Id.
70 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, sec. 1701(c)(1).
71 For a description of the program, see KAREN M. SUTTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10964, “M ADE IN CHINA 2025” INDUSTRIAL POLICIES: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2020).
72 The Ralls corporation later successfully sued CFIUS, with the D.C. Circuit holding that CFIUS had not provided due
process by affording “notice of, and access to, the unclassified information used to prohibit the transaction.” Ralls Corp.
v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
73 50 U.S.C. 4565(a)(4)(B)(ii).
74 See 50 U.S.C. § 4565. A “passive investment” is limited to investments which do not allow access to any material,
nonpublic technical information, membership on the board, or “any involvement, other than through voting of shares,
in substantive decisionmaking” relating to the management, governance, or operation of the United States critical
infrastructure company or United States critical technology company. Id.
68
69
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also heightened notice requirements, imposing a mandatory covered transaction declaration for
transactions involving “an investment that results in the acquisition, directly or indirectly, of a
substantial interest in a United States” critical infrastructure company or United States critical
technology company by a foreign person “in which a foreign government has, directly or indirectly,
a substantial interest.”75
Finally, FIRRMA requires CFIUS to produce reports on Chinese investments particularly,
including:


The amount of total foreign direct investment from China in the U.S., disaggregated by
ultimate beneficial owner.



A breakdown of Chinese investments in the U.S. broken out by deal size, industry,
investment type, and by government and non-government investments.



A list of companies U.S. firms acquired through Chinese government investment.



The number of United States affiliates of entities under Chinese jurisdiction, the total
employees at those affiliates, and the valuation for any publicly-traded United States affiliate
of a Chinese entity.



An analysis of investment patterns, including by volume, type and sector, and the extent to
which those patterns of investments align with the objectives outlined in the Made in China
2025 plan.76

Taken together, the “clear intent” of FIRRMA’s provisions, in the view of a leading practitioner, is
to “give CFIUS greater visibility into a range of Chinese investment in the United States, and in turn
the legislation likely will limit somewhat the totality of Chinese investment in the United States.” 77

Id. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(bb)(AA).
See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, sec. 1719(b)(2).
77 Kuo, supra note 64.
75
76
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An important question arising with any foreign investment regulation is indeed its effect on
overall foreign investment. Accepting the liberal economic order’s assumption that the investment
environment should remain open to “good” investment while still allowing countries to screen out
“bad” investment on the grounds of national security, recent U.S. Treasury data illuminates the
impact of the shift in foreign investment regulation.78 Data provided by the Treasury Department
shows a significant increase in CFIUS enforcement activity under the Trump administration. 79
CFIUS data should always be viewed within the context of mergers and acquisition (M&A) activity
generally; fewer CFIUS notices should be expected in years in which M&A activity is lower, and
more should be expected in years of stronger M&A activity. Comparing M&A activity with CFIUS
notices from the post-FINSA era, we see that is indeed the case (Figure 5).

This framing is common with foreign investment regulation generally. See, for example, the comments of Treasury
Secretary Steven Mnuchin on the signing of FIRRMA: “FIRRMA delivers much-needed reforms that will ensure CFIUS
has the tools necessary to identify, examine, and address national security concerns arising from foreign investment.
America is a vibrant place to invest, and better protecting critical U.S. technology and infrastructure will ensure it stays
that way.” Treasury Secretary Mnuchin Statement on Signing of FIRRMA to Strengthen CFIUS, US DEPT’ OF TREAS. (August 13,
2008), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm457.
79 Practitioners noted this increase as well. See, e.g., Mario Mancuso, CFIUS Report Shows Trump Admin's Push to Curb Risky
M&A, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.kirkland.com/news/in-the-news/2019/11/cfius-reportshows-trump-admins-push-to-curb-risky (noting that the “uptick reflects the general feeling among many CFIUSfocused attorneys that the interagency committee doubled down on efforts to flag potentially risky transactions after
President Donald Trump took office”).
78
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Figure 5. M&A Activity and CFIUS Filing Notices, 2008-2020
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Source: Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (IMAA)80 and U.S. Treasury81 data.

The correlation coefficient between CFIUS notices and total U.S. M&A activity over that
period is 0.93, indicating, as one would expect, that CFIUS notice activity over the period is very
strongly related to overall M&A activity. This correlation thus helps to isolate the impact of CFIUS
enforcement activity over the period. The extremely high correlation between CFIUS notices and
M&A activity suggests that CFIUS regulation of FDI did not have an impact on the total number of
covered transactions; the total number of covered transactions tends to go up and down with M&A
activity generally. However, CFIUS enforcement can have a significant impact on how many
transactions are ultimately rejected (by CFIUS82 or the President), withdrawn, or cleared with
mitigation, and thus some of the impacts on FDI may take several years to reveal themselves, as
foreign investors respond to transactional frictions over time. The CFIUS data, as noted above, does
show a marked increase in enforcement by the number of investigations, the number of transactions
cleared only after mitigation measures were put in place, or the number of notices withdrawn.

Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances, M&A in The United States, https://imaa-institute.org/m-and-a-usunited-states/.
81 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, INFORMATION REGARDING NOTICES AND PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS FOR COVERED
TRANSACTIONS, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Summary-Data-2008-2019.pdf.
82 Treasury notes that “[n]otices can be rejected by the Committee if the parties do not satisfy the requirements in the
regulations or if, during the course of CFIUS review, there is a material change to the transaction or information comes
to light that contradicts material information provided in the notice by the parties.” Id.
80
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Figure 6. CFIUS Filing Notice Outcomes, 2008-2020
Year
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Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Information Regarding Notices and Presidential Decisions for Covered Transactions 83

The impact of the Trump administration’s focus on foreign transactions also becomes clearer when
set out as percentages of transactions withdrawn (some of which were refiled, such as after
mitigation measures were put in place to ensure U.S. national security interests), or were abandoned
entirely, as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Percentage of Covered Transactions Withdrawn
Year
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Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Information Regarding Notices and Presidential Decisions for Covered Transactions 84
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Id. at 3.
Id. at 2-3.
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What is apparent is an immediate jump in enforcement in the first year of Trump
administration enforcement, followed by a smoothing out that perhaps represented more careful
notice filings. A reduction in transactions likely followed that would be covered under CFIUS, as
some foreign investors presumably avoided deals that would trigger CFIUS. Merger activity in 2019,
for example, showed an uptick in deals but no proportionate increase in CFIUS filings. This
possibility, suggested by the lack of a significant increase in CFIUS notices in a year (2019) marked
by significantly higher M&A activity, indicates that perhaps foreign investors were beginning to
respond to a less welcoming U.S. investment environment in 2019 by avoiding CFIUS-covered
deals. In 2020, M&A activity decreased by 16%, but CFIUS filings decreased by a greater 19%, again
potentially suggesting that filings were not keeping up with M&A activity as they traditionally would.
Data from 2021 (to be released by CFIUS later this year) will provide evidence on enforcement
priorities under the Biden administration.
With reference to China specifically, Chinese investment activity in the United States has
markedly decreased since the passage of FIRRMA. For example, the U.S.-China Investment Project
reports that venture capital investment from China in 2019 dropped by almost half after the 2018
enactment of FIRMMA, although investment rebounded in somewhat in 2020. 85
It is not merely foreign investment barriers that cause decreasing foreign investment, of
course. Particularly when addressing Chinese foreign investments, the domestic constraints on
Chinese investments play a key role in determining how and when Chinese firms (whether stateowned or not) invest in foreign markets. Much of the recent data on decreased Chinese investment
activity is not attributable to FIRRMA, but to Chinese capital controls. In late 2016, Chinese
US-China Investment Project, Two-Way Street: 2021 Update, US-China Investment Trends 29, RHODIUM GRP.,
https://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/RHG_TWS-2021_Full-Report_Final.pdf (finding that “[i]nvestment
dropped by almost half to $2.3 billion in 2019 after the enactment of FIRRMA, which made certain venture transactions
subject to CFIUS review. Defying the pandemic and US-China technology frictions, investment grew again in 2020 to
$3.2 billion”).
85
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regulators sought to curb “irrational” outbound investment, in part to ensure the robust health of
China’s reserves.86 New restrictions encouraged certain investments while discouraging and
prohibiting others; some of the restricted sectors, such as real estate, hospitality, and entertainment,
had made up a large percentage of Chinese acquisitions in the United States in recent years. 87 Some
of the downturn in flow has come from Chinese government efforts to restrict outbound capital
flows. Year over year, Chinese M&A transactions in the United States declined by 90%. 88
Yet, we cannot assume these policies were made in a vacuum, solely to preserve Chinese
reserves. President Trump had already taken office at the time of the shift. And, of course, for over
a year prior to that, candidate Donald Trump had clearly signaled his interest in taking a tougher
stand on China and Chinese investment in the United States. China may have been responding to
Trump administration signaling while also acknowledging the need to focus on a domestic policy
concern. China may also have determined to invest less in the United States for internal and external
policy considerations. One data point supporting this more nuanced view is the fact that while
Chinese investment in the United States remained low after the imposition of stricter capital
controls, it rebounded in the rest of the world in the latter half of 2017. 89
More to the point, an enhanced focus on Chinese investment also served as a significant
barrier even prior to the enactment of FIRRMA in 2018. In 2017, the first year of the Trump
administration, an “unprecedented number of Chinese deals were delayed or abandoned . . . as
parties failed to obtain approval from [CFIUS].”90 From this perspective, FIRRMA is doing exactly
Hu Yongqi, Irrational Outbound Investment Curbed, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-10/24/content_33638951.htm.
87 Thilo Hanemann & Daniel H. Rosen, Chinese FDI in the US in 2017: A Double Policy Punch, RHODIUM GRP. (Jan. 17,
2018), https://rhg.com/research/chinese-fdi-in-the-us-in-2017-a-double-policy-punch/.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. (noting that among the transactions “abandoned during the year because of unresolved CFIUS concerns” were
Canyon Bridge Capital’s acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor, Zhongwang’s acquisition of Aleris Corp, Orient Hontai’s
acquisition of a stake in Applovin and HNA’s acquisition of a stake in Global Eagle Entertainment). In 2018, Ant
Financial abandoned its proposed acquisition of Moneygram. Rhodium estimates that “[i]f completed, these deals would
have added at least another $7-8 billion to the 2017 headline figure.” Id.
86
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what it was intended to do with respect to Chinese investment: Chinese deals have dropped
significantly, and those that survive appear to be subject to heightened scrutiny. While the Trump
administration was never able to build the wall that featured so prominently in President Trump’s
campaign speeches, the United States erected and enforced a strong barrier against Chinese
investment during his term.
V.

CONCLUSION
Foreign investment regulation is a poor tool to manage discontent with globalization. Even

when viewed in a more limited role as a means to limit technology transfer to China, foreign
investment rules are likely to be lacking. Much of the technology transfer that occurs is not through
Chinese direct investment, but rather through forced technology transfer arrangements involving
firms operating in China.91 As a mechanism for managing China’s ascension, foreign investment
regulation also fails to “take on the crucial long-term concern of assimilating China as a normal actor
in the global economic system”92 by failing to recognize China’s asymmetric motives in its foreign
investments: while sellers to Chinese firms have private motives for pursuing transactions, at least
some Chinese acquirers have “non-economic motivations.”93
Foreign investment regulation may help deal with some of the symptoms of globalization—like
tariffs, CFIUS can be used to provide a visible response to politically-sensitive international
transactions. But it does not pretend to deal with the realities of dislocation and disruption
associated with globalization.

See Zimmerman, supra note 64, at 1292.
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Curtis J. Milhaupt, China as a 'National Strategic Buyer': Towards a Multilateral Regime for Cross-Border
M&A, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 192, 200-01 (2019).
93 Id. at 198.
91
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There seems to be an important causal claim implicit in the recent cycle of restrictive foreign
investment regulations: such regulation acts as a response to foreign (and especially Chinese)
behavior, rather than as a response to domestic concerns. But causal links may rely on a more
complex mix of foreign and domestic forces. For example, other countries may enjoy certain
comparative advantages, such as a surplus of relatively inexpensive labor, resulting in domestic
concerns about closed factories and jobs lost to global competition. This is not to argue that recent
changes in foreign investment regulation, like FIRRMA, are not justified by China’s investment
practices. But these changes may also flow from domestic anxieties related to technological changes
and outsourcing decisions made solely to maximize shareholder value—decisions linked to
globalization generally—rather than merely as a direct result of Chinese monetary and investment
practices.

